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1981 ACTXVXTY RUPORT 
AEROSPACE SAFETY ADVSSORY PANEL 
1. E X 8 C U t i V e  SUStmary 
In 1981, the first tu0 Shuttle flights uete accoaplirhed 8nd 
the Aerospac8 Safety Advl8ory Pane1 (ASAP) logically concrntrat8d 
on the process of preparation for flight and the gathering of 
information from these flights to confirm the concept rnd 
performance of the major eleaentr of th8 Space Ttrnlportation 
System. In this year's activities it became obvious to the Panel 
that the safety of the Shuttle operation would be increasingly 
dependent on (1) the procedures f o r  turnaround, (2) the ability to 
quickly assess system performance from flight expevience, (3) the 
developing judgment concerning what needed to be rechecked for 
each operation, and (4) the astute creation of truly moperationalm 
procedures which would be simple enough to realize cost raving and 
thorough enough to maintain safe and reliable operations. 
Following this line of reasoning, the ASAP hrs reviewed its 
membership, has revised it to amplify operational know-how, and 
has turned its rttention to the operational plans that NASA i s  
developing and the organization concepts thrt will be used in 
fulfilling those plans. 
In the current budget environment, it is recognized that many 
of the significant system changes previously suggested by the ASAP 
and those recommended in this report will not be feasible f o r  
retrofit in the present Orbiter production reries. Fu a direct 
result, a number of the present systems will require more 
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continuing special readiness attention than revised systems 
designed to be optimum for routine operation. 
limiting circumstances the ASAP conriders that the e8timated 21 
flights per year with 4 Orbiters will be very difficult to 
achieve. 
not prevent planning for an orderly R I D  and certification program 
to create more nearly optimum operational systems. Such systems 
will then be available for incorporation in future Orbiters or for 
retrofit in the event that other factors, such as a demand for 
major performance improvements, dictate an extensive change 
proq r am. 
Under th8se 
Eaving to use the hardware currently available should 
In reviewing the gincidents' which have occurred during STS-1 
and STS-2 flights, it is apparent that the RLD nature of these 
first efforts, along with the reliance on complex paper systems 
for documenting the check and balance functions, have nearly 
obscured the necessity for personal, 'on the floor,' 
responsibility of supervision at all levels for safety and 
success. Yany details of doubtful importance are raised to the 
highest management levels for decision by-passing the judgment of 
middle management and clouding the truly important issues that 
should be defined for major management decisions. The Safety 
Assessment Report, the Acccpttd R i s k  Summary, and the Critical 
Issues procedures as made available to the ASAP are examples of 
systems that shculd be reexamined for simplification and 
reorientation to identify the issues that truly need top 
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management attention. 
procedures rhould emerge, along with tighter dhcipllna to a8sure 
properly scheduled events and avoid last minute hprovimtions 
which can introduce hidden hazards. 
In this procers limplified turnaround 
The concept of the trrnrportation system itself, including the 
essential subsystems, should 8fSO be reviewed for operational 
simplicity along with the management and procedures. The ASAP has 
attempted to review the basic architecture of the essential 
subsystems and recognizes that, in a number of cases, the 
state-of-the-8rt in modern transports and military aircraft offers  
opportunities for improving the safety and reliability of Shuttle 
systems based on mature concepts that have been operationally 
proven. Specifically, the ASAP recommends a major audit of the 
concept of redundant systems as applied to the essential elements 
of the Shuttle. The Panel believes that a more consistent 
approach to redundancy throughout all systeins will simplify the 
elements and reduce costs while enhancing safety. The Panel 
recognizes that changes of any kind mu-t await schedule and budget 
"windows" but suggests that an orderly subsystem improvement 
program can reduce ultimate costs and improve turnaround time. 
Previous advice to NASA on turnaround procedures implied 
changes in organizational functions within NASA. The ASAP has 
suggested that a purely operational organization should be created 
that would function like an airline or a military mission command 
as compared to an engineering and development organization. Such 
an operational entity would relieve the R L D  organization of 
responsibilities it is ill-equipped to handle and would improve 
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the RLD function itself by rtrbilithg the p8rfotmnC8 
requirement8 and by developing future customers to justify 
continuing development programs. The opatrtionrl organirrtion, it 
is suggested, should putchrse rervices and hrtdurte from the 
development part of NASA much as an airline putchrrer its 
trrnrport rfrcraft, spares, technical ruppott, and early training 
from the aircraft manufacturer. 
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11. STS-1 and STS-2  Turnaround Process rnd Base Operations 
As could be elcpected, the turnaround of 6s-1  and STS-2 had 
to be modified to accommodate the performance of major rubsyst8ms 
and the condition of these systems. As the Panel has reviewed 
these activities it is obvious that the preparation, and the basic 
design, produced a near miracle in functional success. The 
systems representing the most ambitious penetration o f  the 
state-of-the-art, the rain engines and the thermal protection 
system, performed almost perfectly. Similarly the control and 
attitude, primary instrumentation, and boost propulsion units all 
functioned as required. This remarkable performance nust not be 
forgotten in reviewing potential hprovements in the turnaround 
process -- it suggests that a number o f  present subsystems will 
readily demonstrate 'operational status" and permits relaxation of 
*every flight" test and check requirements. 
The Panel's annual report for 1980, in the section on NASA 
Review System, discussed the Panel's generally positive 
conclusions regarding the commitment of top rnar.agement to achieve 
an acceptable level of risk prior to authorizing the first manned 
Orbital flight of the Space Shuttle. We can reaffirm these 
conclusions in the present annual report. Panel members 
participated in all major program and flight readiness reviews 
prior to STS-1 and STS-2. Concerns reported by the Panel to top 
management, such as Orbiter entry stability and control, Orbiter 
seat eject system, S?B overpressure, timely recovery of the crew 
after landing, STS-2 launch schedule, and flight control analysis 
of off-nominal conditions, were carefully examined and documented 
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report8 were made to the Panel. Thr new NASA ranagerent tram, 
from the Administrator on down, reaffirmed their predecrssors~ 
commitment to achi8Ving an acceptable lrvrl of ti8k prior to the 
flight of STS-2. 
Apparent in the preparation and turnaround was the 
predominant control of the process by the development 
practitioners of NASA and the understandable lack of patterns and 
experiments to reduce turnaround time and cost. 
concern to the ASAP was the apparent lack of Ofloor 
responsibility" at KSC. The Panel believes that the hypergolic 
propellant spill incidents demonstrate poor local supervision of 
specific procedures and a vague line of authority for essential 
tasks. Other evidence of poor discipline were instances of 
Shuttle damage by ground gear not clear of moving surfaces and 
ineffective access control of Shuttle areas not habitable due to 
the suspected presence of gases. The Panel recognizes the 
complexity of controlling a mix of personnel from other centers, 
many contractors, and base personnel, not to mention multiple 
advisors. The Panel also recognizes that written procedures by 
themselves can never substitute for capable "on the floor" 
supervision adhering to such procedures. Operations management 
must be in charge to make the tota3 process su~~essful. NASA 
organization responsibilities clear to the top need to be 
re-identified before simplification of the turnaround is achieved. 
Of particular 
Of particular concern to the Panel from a design and system 
standpoint is the practice of m,jor reprogramming between flights. 
?or normal transport operations the essential content of the 
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airborne and ground support computer rerrories rhould remain 
untouched from flight to flight, limiting reprogramming to that 
necessitated by the particulr cargo bring carried. 
reprogramming should be approached on the baris that there will be 
common functions for all payloads that can be accounodated without 
mission to mission reprogramming except for constants or f-Loads. 
A. Readiness Review Process 
Even this 
The ASAP believes that the readiness process needs to be 
reconstituted before it is effective for operations. 
To the Psnel it appears that: 
1. Reliability, safety, and quality organizations should 
be more clearly in the decision loops and the 
documentation process appears to be used more for 
post operation justification of actions than f o r  
deciding on readiness. 
2. The documentation used for summarizing risk and 
evaluation of readiness as repreranted by the safety 
assessment report, the accepted risk summary, and the 
critical issues summary all appear to be dedicated to 
listing every possible concern so that retrospective 
examination will find no basis for criticizing 
thoroughness. These procedural activities did not 
appear to represent a management level by level 
evaluation of risks and a summary of judgmental total 
risk truly suitable for  use by higher management. 
3. The inherent assurance of having a separate 
operations team Independently assess readiness, 
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as is the case with established trrnsportation 
systems may not function adequately with NASA's 
present structure to assure an independent readiness 
opinion. 
Transportation Syrtem has developed a pattern whereby 
Headquarters balances input from the .program,. the 
Historically, management of the Space 
centers, and the test community. Thus, no one 
organization within NASA has full responsibility for 
operations decisions. This must be modified before a 
routine and reliable operations function can achieve 
success. 
B. Technical Audit Process 
Among the many successes of STS-1 and STS-2 was a technical 
audit initiated at Houston to review and supplement the more 
routine sneak circuit analyses. This ad hoc function did not use 
"indepe-dent" evaluators or professional safety or quality 
assurance practitioners. It utilized the design team members who 
were responsible for major elements of the Shuttle systems and 
therefore had familiarity with the fundamentals of the systems and 
their limitations. They were also familiar with the test 
successes and failures and the interface functions among the 
elements . 
The success of the ad hoc technical audit suggests that the 
process should be expanded in support of future Shuttle concept 
changes and improvement programs. It should also be considered by 
any new operations organization to assess routine processes and 
procedures and suggest new approaches which could save costs 
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without increasing hazards. The ASAP bellever thrt the 8uccess of 
such ad hoc teams stems from the currency of their technical or 
operational experience, their total familiarity with the system 
and their lack of dedicrtion to any routine reportfng or 
documentation discipline. 
C. Orbiter Performance and Control Margins 
The RLD program of four flights may be adequate to assess the 
safe operation of the system, but routine efficient operations 
require knowledge of the boundaries of performance that may not be 
fully established within the planned RCD effort. 
be established for continued performance envelope expansion to 
improve operational ut!lity. Examples of the limitations include, 
c o g .  limits for re-entry control, launch tower clearance for broad 
weather variables, and a myriad of redline limits which must be 
cleared before launch. 
A plan needs to 
The Panel is particularly concerned with the demonstrated 
ambivalence to 'redline" limitations. Redline limits should be 
set, and presumably have been, by zombining accumulated experience 
of both design and safety engineers. To override such judgment in 
the readiness and launch environment potentially introduces 
unevaluated risks. This should be avoided in any cas and -- must be 
for any operational mode. The Panel conclusion from this 
experience is that "redlines" should be reassessed -- this may be 
a task for an ad hoc technical audit team. This could reinove 
unjustified conservatism and could provide a rational basis 
the rigid 'redline' discipline which bust be achieved. 
for 
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I f f .  - New Function Emphasis for Transport Systems 
The development of the Shuttle was 8 nasuive research and 
developmen:: task bone by or under the direction of WASA'r  
developmcnt-orient8d centers. This was appropriate rnd 
successful. The task after the remaining development flight6 is 
to operate the present system in as economic and routine a manner 
as is possible. In addition, it is necessary to g a i n  information 
that will create requirements for progressive improvements ,r 
needs that will become the basis for future new systems. 
To achieve routine operation, the Panel believes that the 
Shuttle must be operated by a separate organization, with 
facilities dedicated to transportation services alone. Much like 
an airline or a military operational base, this organization 
should have no research and development charter nor capability but 
should be staffed by an experienced cadre of operational people. 
Although there are many capable "testm people in NASA the ultimate 
success of the transport system probably depends on N A S A ' s  ability 
to attract new people both in house and via contrac;. A clearly 
separate operations organization will be helgful in recruiting 
such talent. 
Properly constituted and manned, such a transport 
organization would have the capability to: 
o A s s e s s  hardware performance on the basis of operational 
reliability, reusability and low cost. 
o Emphasize logistics planning, including spares. 
o Assess changes on a cost and reliability basir rather 
than on performance improvement alone and control there 
changes. 
Base operations planning only on prylord n9ed thereby 
producing reliable schedules, and an operations budget 
plan that reflects cost savJ;- 4s due to learning. 
o 
o Create requirements for future performance improvements 
based on "market. needs -- for NASA itself as a customer, 
commercial programs, and the military. 
o Stabilize the rate of technical change, simplify 
procedures, and reduce the traffic of decision demand 
upon Headquarters. 
o Develop future customers. 
A.  Subcontract - Services Required by "Space Transportation" from 
the R&D Organizations 
It would be naive to think that the Shuttle and its operation 
would not require subst tial continuing research and development 
as experit. 'ce generates e'.t.het fiew demands or desirable 
improvements from a cost or safety point of view. To accomplish 
this the operationai organization must have a formal channel, and 
be required, to call opon NASA's rasearch and development elements 
for the necessary work on essentiblly & subcontract basis. This 
will assure that the proper people do the work snd that an 
appropriate framework for financial control is maintained and 
monitored. A few 5xamples of the activities or functions that the 
operational organization rhould obtain from the rereurch and 
development elements of NASA are: 
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1. The creation of any n8w Shuttle transportation elements, 
the requirements for which 8hould be defined by tbe 
operations orgahizatfon bared on transportation customer 
needs. 
2. The engineering required for changes to improve 
reliability, safety, cost or performance, the requirements 
for  which are similarly originated and defined by the 
operational organization. 
3. System and component testing services, including the 
certification of new or changed components or systems. 
4. The advisory support of development specialists on a 
consulting basis. 
S. The establishment of a formal program for the continuing 
performance audit of flight and ground systems, including 
tracking, communications and data systems. 
B. Space Transportation Services Provided to RLD Elements of NASA 
The Panel suggestion that the operational Space Transportation 
System look to the scientists and engineers elsewhere in NASA for 
research and development is coupled with a similar recommendation 
that the RLD community of NASA look to the transportation service 
organization for the performance of transportation and operations 
tasks for all of NASA. This on a 'subcontract. basis in order to 
implement a framework for monitoring functional, financial, and 
schedule performance. A few examples of these services are fuund 
in the op-.ration of OSTS (Office of Space Transportation Systems) 







The transport, or orbit81 placement, of payloads, 
The orbital repair or retrieval of pay108dS. 
The eventual maintenance of orbital facilities for u n n e d  
or unmanned experiments, 
Data delivery from orbital experiacnt6 for 8nalysia by 
those responsible for *he experiments. 
Launch services and appropriate support for non-Shuttle 
systems. 
C. A Framework for Successful Routine Operations 
Last year's report by the ASAP commented upon the need for 
expanding its attention to the entire subject of logistics, 
payloads, and operations. These subjects, until the completion of 
two successful launches, have been transcended by the pressures of 
the research and development demands, With the production 
lead-times characteristic of small-batch highly specialized 
products a study which will lead to investment ranging from space 
engines and airframe components to the multitudinous system and 
accessary components is probably already overdue. The Panel is 
directing its attention to this operational phase and can be 
ieeted to require access to activities and developing programs 
in which its experience and expertise should be of value. The 
Panel looks forward to full Cooperation from cognizant 
organization. 
Maintenance and overhaul plans must first be developed in 
detail for KSC and VAFB and then, using these, such logistics 
elements as supply, manning, training, publications, and vehicle 
standardization can more logically fall into place. A range of 
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turnaround rater should b8 considered from the nort optimirtic to 
the perrimittic, the latter conridering th~.passible grounding of 
one vehicle due to accidental durage or modification. The ground 
support equipment and requirements have no parallel in previous 
practice and matters affecting overh8ul and in-service l i f e  
arising from repeated launch degradation are in need of special 
study now. Until thir mort comprehensive planning is undertaken 
it will be difficult to maintain budgetary control in 8 program 
which has now to be very cost-consciaus. Schedule reli8bility is 
the sine qua non to attract commercial and even military payload8 
and, in the view of some Panel members, is more likely to be 
affected around 1983-85 by parts shortages than by equipment or 
design fail Ires.  
In attempting to assess its own capabilities to review future 
Space Transportation Operations the ASAP produced a broad outline 
of functions that must somehow be fulfilled by a truly operational 
organization. Although many of these needs have no direct impact 
on safety they do have an impact on the routine nature of any 
transport system, and therefore a secondary but important impact 
on the recognition of hazards. At the rates of the orbital 
missions now planned, it will be absolutely essential that 
procedures stay consistent, changes be reduced to near zero, and 
that the launch teams be experienced, well trained, and have 
qualified spares at hand. 
D. Prime Functions of Transport Operations 
1. Planning and markctinq 
a. Planning for present market 
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b. Fcture payload and orbit needs (c~lmerce, 
government, military) 
C. Total traffic projection 
d. Service cost projection 
e. Service pricing policy recommendrtionr 
f .  Selling of services 
2. Engineering and operations 
a. Definition o f  product improvement needs 
b. Facility Planning 
c. Logistics plans and operations 
d. Support and procurement (spates, fluids, 
services) 
e . Schedul ing 
f . Overhaul and maintenance 
g. Base operations (launch and landing) support 
h. Quality assurance 
i. Cost control of transport system services 
j. Payload services to customers 
k .  Training 
3. Tracking, communications and data rervices 
a b  Routine support of operations 
b b  Payload communications and customer data service 
e. System and data base, modernization requircmtnts 
d. Cost control of track, communication, data 
services 
e. Training 
I V .  Continuinq Activitier of the Aero8prce Safety Adviroty Prnel 
A. Prnel Membership 
A8 noted tn the executive ~ummrry, Prnel remberrhip to 
provide operational experience has been rugr.ntod by memberit 
John F. I4cDonald8 Vice President Technic81 Smvice8 of 
nieerAir, Inc., the parent corporrtion f o r  ?lying Tige t8 .  John F. 
Muoonald 6erved for a number of years 8s Vice president of 
Malitenarce rnd Engineering, rnd as a director for the Flying 
Ticizr Line. Previous to that, he directed rll commercirl 
customer support activities for the Lockheed Crlifornir Coaprny. 
He was educated as a mechanical engineer in Englrnd and 8etved 
British Overseas Airways Corporation before coming to America. 
Norman R. Parmet, recently retired Vice President of 
Engineering and Quality Assurance for TransWorld Airlines. Norm 
!Barmet has served TWA since 1947 in a number of roles including 
plant development and as Vice President for New Equipment 
Devclopmenr as well as Logistics Hanage3ent. He was graduated 8s 
a mechanical engineer from Drexel Institute of Technology. 
Plans for 1982 include a replacement for Dr. Seymour C. 
?limnel, whose term of appointment at a member was completed in 
1981, and ha. been retained as a consultant for one year. It is 
hoped t; I his replacement will bring to the Panel similar 
expevtite in the power plant field, particularly in hypergolic 
+ystt!ms which now appear to require concentrated attention. 
During the year ,  it is also hoped that the Panel can be augmented 
by exper:ence in the architectwe of modern control systems. 
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B. Inform81 Subgroup Activities 
It is expected that inforrrl subgroup8 of the Panel will b. 
formed to follow certrin specific activities. 
the following appear to be particularly irportantt 
In the view of ASAP 
1. An assessent of 8ny continuing technic81 audit 
function instituted by the RCD program management. 
Such concentr8t.d technical assessment w8s 
responsible for uncovering sneak circuit hazards 
prior to STS-2, 8nd should be continued reeklng 
improvements in safety and reliability for the 
electrical, electronic, and computational systems. 
2. Suggested in this report is an audit of the systems 
redundancy concepts for the many Shuttle subsystems. 
The Panel believes that major simplification is 
possible which could benefit cost, performance, and 
safety. If alternative concepts cannot be 
arcommodatad within budget and schedule constraints, 
they can be incorporated in subsequent block buys of 
improve?! transportation systems and should be 
initiated now. 
3. If NASA reorganizes to include an independent 
aoperationsa entity, a safety audit team should 
review the transition of procedures from RID to 
operations. The criticality of this transition and 
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the obvious need for r.assive procedures 
simplification suggest that continuing audit will 
be required. The ASAP will assess this activity or 
its equivalent. 
C. Plans for 1982 
The Panel has opetated in the mode of fact finding by 
individual members or small informal groups visiting the 
appropriate centers and contractors. During the year the Panel 
compares notes and communicates with top NASA management. It is 
the Panel's intention to continue in this fashion, probably with 
an increased number of times when the entire Panel participates in 
the readiness activities prior to STS-3,-4,-5, and -6. It is 
planned to follow Orbiter 099 and particularly note the  impact on 
operational procedures with two Orbiters being readied for launch 
in parallel. 
The actual dates and locations of Panel fact-findings are to 
be keyed to the Shuttle major milestones recognizing the increased 
activity planned for  Shuttle payloads with accompanying hardware 
and software impacts. Payloads include OSSA-1, Spacelab, Tracking 
& Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), and the probable 
incotporation of the Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU). In addition 
t o  such payloads it is expected that the Panel will review 
concepts for upper stage propulsion systems and any early proposal 
for basic Shuttle performance improvements such as light weight 
SRB's or a light weight Expendable Tank. 
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KSC intends to have a 8elf-8ufficient Shuttle Processing 
Contractor when the Space Shuttle becomes operational. It is of 
interest to the Panel that such I transition take place without 
any loss of emphasis on ground and flight safety, 
Although the Panel's efforts directed at programs other than 
the Space Transportation System require less concentrated 
attention they are equally important from the viewpoint of NASA's 
public accountability regarding their safety, In creating the 
Panel, Congress clearly envisioned this broader responsibility. 
These areas include aeronautics programs (manned and unmamed), 
unmanned space vehicles, and tracking and data acquisition as it 
affects safe mission operation. In tines of great budget 
stringency, such as the present, it is especially important that 
safety considerations not be permitted to erode as program 
managers stretch their highly-constrained program resources to 
achieve desired objectives. 
The following is a sample of those areas that are of 
continuing concern to the Panel: 
1. Other Flight Operations: The concentration on the 
early Shuttle flights has diverted the Panel's 
attention from flight operations at Ames, Dryden, and 
Langley. Past Panel experience hss shown that NASA 
controls the safety of test operations most carefully 
at these centers and the record shows good 
performance. 
aircraft not operating under strict NASA test control 
suggest that reviews should be nede of procedures 
Several accidents involving flight in 
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whereby NASA personnel are exposed to hazard in 1888 
than controlled te8t condition$. The Panel plans to 
assess policies at these centers and revi8w the 
control c,f ruch activities. 
2. Pressure System Recertification: It has been 
suggested that the ASAP revieu how NASA certifies the 
pressure vessels and systems at its many facilities 
and how it maintains such certification. The Panel 
believes that its primary purpose is to concentrate 
on the safety aspects of manned flight and on the 
safety implications of operating unmanned systems 
rather than on what is normally called industrial 
safety. It is the Panel's assumption that industrial 
safety is a center function which has been 
successfully fulfilled through the years and will not 
address this important subject unless instructed to 
do so by the Administrator. 
3. Contracting Out: Budget pressures and the efforts to 
provide more flexibility in manpower levels as 
operational efficiencies are achieved suggest that 
many more program operations be placed under 
contract. This does not relieve NASA of the 
supervisory responsibility. The inadequate 
compensation schedule of the Federal Government for 
top level managers makes it increasingly difficult to 
maintain a management team of highest technical and 
managerial competence. The exodus of key NASA 
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perr-me1 during the  pat’- y8ar provider 8ttiking 
confirmation of thi8 grave problem. Although the  
Administration and Congress recently collrborrtrd in 
rchieving 8 rmall increare in th8  F8darrl pay cap, 
the problem is 8till unresolved and likely to remain 
so under present extreme budgetary pressures. The 
Panel believes it is essential to point out that 
loyalty and dedication to NASA 0- 8 hallmark of  the 
Nation’s space program to date -- can only go so far 
in substituting for a pay schedule that is truly 
competitive with private industry. fn this 
environment it is essential that contractors be 
chosen who can bring the maximum experience to the 
program. 
4 0  Hydrogen Safety Standard: The Panel suggestion of a 
future lydroqen-oxygen auxiliary power system and the 
use of this fuel combination for on-Orbit reaction 
control systems imply different safety standards than 
are currently used for the fuel cells. In addition, 
the possible use of the Centaur as an upper stage in 
the Orbiter and the emerging potential of LHp Q S  an 
aircraft Out1 all indicate that the Panel should 
review existing safety standards for handling 
hydrogen in flight vehicles and in ground facilities 
for storage and service. The Panel will initiate such 
r review. 
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5. NASA-Air Force Coordinrtiont AShP 8ctiviti.s hrv8 
not inClUd8d m y  reviews of Air ?orc8 launch 
facilities or riaulrtion activities. Much could be 
learned from new approaches and it is rra*jard that 
NASA is fully frmilirr with Air Force activities. 
The ASAP will rely on inttructlons from th8 
Administrator before making any requests to the Air 
Force for information. 
2 2  
v. 8 8  
Operating Safety and Perfotnrnc8 
The two successful flights of the Columbia have demonstrated 
that the Shuttle can perform as I space launch vehicle and that 
the Orbiter can be reused 0- an outstanding technological 
achievement. Even the mort enthusiastic proponent of the Shuttle 
would not, however, claim that its present design can achieve the 
level of operational reliability (and hence safety) required for 
economical and 'routine" transportation to and from space. There 
a r e  Shuttle subsystems and components that, although acceptable 
for use during a flight test program and early transiton to 
operations, art not optimum for routine operational use. Even 
though the flight test program has just begun, it is 
optimistically planned to be nearly complete with only two more 
flights. It is not too soon to begin the process of study, 
analysis, design, and planning to improve the operating safety, 
cost, and performance of the Shuttle by reassessing it essential 
e 1 aments . 
A two-part effort is required to achieve the improvements 
desired. The first part is a systems-engineering effort -- a 
racxamination of the consistency with which systems design 
princiolas have been used. The second part will necessarily 
rddress new designs or design modifications of specific hardware 
to achieve simplification, improved safety, and enhanced 
performance. 
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A. Redundancy Review 
The Shuttle employs redundancy in its ayrtemr to achieve high 
reliability &;id thus safety. The degree of redundancy employed, 
however, varies from subsystem to rubsystem. ?or ex&mple, in the 
flight control system the main computers are quadruple-redundant 
with a backup computer (and software) and a spare computer that 
the crew can install. The hydraulic system that provides the 
power to move the Orbiter flight control surfaces is 
triple-redundant in pumps and hydrazine-fueled turbines, is not 
redundant for each main engine control and it is double-redundant 
for each Solid Rocket Booster. The hydraulic actuators that move 
the surfaces are simplex with duplex servo-valves. The main 
engine thrust controllers have dual computers and a "lock-up' 
feature in the propellant valve system designed to retain thrust 
level in the event of a total controllsr failure. 
Similar diversity in the use of redundancy exists in other 
vehicle systems. This raises the question of whether safety 
conce2ts have been employed in a consistent manner in the Shuttle 
systems design. 
It would be advisable, therefore, to establish an "audit" team 
o f  experienced RLD systsms-engineers to review the design of 
Shuttle systems to ascertain whether consistent safety/reliability 
concepts and criteria have been employed in the design. Where 
such consistency does not exist, the team should recommend design 
changes to provide such uniformity. At a minimum, this team should 
review the following: 
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o Hydraulic power syrtesar 
o Flight control rystwn architecture 
o Main engine thrust control rystea 
o Main and backup comp-iter systems (including 
programming) 
o Electric power system (including fuel cells) 
o Cammunication and data systems 
B. Specific Systems 
Thpre are a number of systems which can be improved by 
redesign or design modification. The Panel believes thcr the 
following systems deserve attention in approximately the order 
listed. 
1. Landing gear: At present the margin of safety of the 
gear for the  rigi in ally-established design conditions is 
low. In addition, the design is such that should a tire 
fail, its mate (almost certainly) would also fail -- a 
potential hazard. Redesign of the gear incorporating a 
larger nun4 : of wheels than the current configuration 
would improve both the load-carrying capacity and enhance 
the operational safety of the system. Experience has 
shown that debris from the wheel oround fnterfacc has 
damaged the thermally-protected Shuttle swface. In sny 
redesign, an effort shou?d be made to d i v e r t  such debris 
away from contact kith the Shuttle -- sprcy ribs on the 
tires might be he1pfi.l. 
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Solid Rocket boosters: At present, the gimballed ORB 
nozzles provide part of the control authority during 
ascent;. 
power units for the gimbal actuators. These 
hydratine-fueled turbopunrp systems arm complex and heavy. 
It was prudent to provide this control capacity for the 
early flights as it is not possible to predict with 
Each SRB is equipped with I p8ir o f  hydraulic 
suitaole accuracy the control moments required during 
ascent in the absence of flight data for the unique 
configuration of the Shuttle. Now that flight data are 
becoming available, this system should be examined 
carefully to determine whether all the control authority 
provided is necessary or whether the SSMEs alone can 
provide all that is needed. In the latter event, the SRB 
auxiliary power units could be eliminated and relatively 
slow-acting electric actuators substituted to provide a 
programmed pitch profile during boost as the center of 
gravity changes. The savings in weight, complexity, and 
safety should be significant. 
Additional performance improvement might be obtained by 
employing a composite material for the SRM case insteer*, 
of the metal now used. This possibility should be 
studied thoroughly. Finally, the booster recovery system 
should be reexamined to see if it cannot be made 
substantially more simp. than it is now. 
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3. Cockpit and Crew Station msiqnt The crew ha8 ryriad 
duties to perforr in the cockpit. 
times, approach the 8atUtatiOn point. During 6Ts-2, the 
crew ~ ~ t k l o a d ,  aggravated by senror anoulier and the 
fuel cell problem, became 80 heavy that the crew fell a 
couple of hours behind in the .Crew Activity Schedule.. 
The many sensor and transducer indications of oredlineg 
approach or penetration, therrostat rrlfunctions, etC.8 
raise the question of whether the qualification and 
certification for such instrumentaton ir adequate. A 
thorough scrubdown of the cockpit displays, controls L 
switches, and the reliability of the sensors furnishing 
the information is indicated. In addition to assuring 
that the crew is furnished needed and valid data it is 
probable that a combination of automation and 
simplification would make Shuttle flight an easier task 
for the crew and thus safer. 
During discussions with the flight crew of STS-1 concern 
was noted over the design of the emergency egress systems 
after flight STS-I when the ejection seats are scheduled 
to be removed. The entire Panel did inspect the mockups 
available at JSC and concurs with the crew comments that 
an important safety concern exists. Of particular import 
is crew egress after ditching. The Panel heard an 
outline for future study at JSC and reviewed what was 
known of previous tests. It appeared to the Panel that 
substantially more effort to determine likely scenarios 
The uorklord can, at 
2 7  
and their consequencer i s  in order, 
ray be ertremely remote thi8 doer not relieve NASA of the 
responsibility to provide the crew with 88 great a chance 
to survive a8 porrible, 
Although ditching 
4. SIP Uaterial Irprovenent: One of the ptobl888 of the 
Orbiter thermal protection 8yst.r 1s the hysteresis in 
the stress-strain relationship in the strain isolation 
pad (SIP) material. A new version of the material with 
organized fiber orientation and consistent adhesion to 
the structure and the tile, rather than the random 
orientation of fibers in the present material, offers the 
promise of substantially reduced, if not eliminated, 
hysteresis. This development should be pursued actively. 
5, Flight Control: At present, each control surface of the 
Orbiter is a single structure driven by a single 
actuator. Such simplex configurations are undesirable 
and are avoided in modern transport and military 
aircraft. Two alternative configurations have been 
employed in transport aircraft. The first is to employ a 
set of smaller independent control surfaces and actuators 
in place of a single large surface and actuator, The 
second is to use multiple actuators in parallel or in 
tandem on a single surface. Either approach enhances 
operational reliability and safety and these should be 
studied for possible incorparation in the operational 
Shuttle design. The Orbiter shares the problem of 
directional instability at high mach numbers with most 
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modern auprrsonic fighter8 due to the vertlcal tall 
being blanked by the 8hock wave8 amlnatlng on the foiuard 
surfaces of the vehicle. mi8 ha8 t08u l td  i n  changeo i n  
the computer handling of the reentry m8newers and the 
use of yaw thrusters neatly d o m  to Mach 1. 
direct reference 8ysten ha8 already been designed and 
qualified tt would 8een prudent to utilize thi8 Shuttle 
Entry A i r  Data Systen (StADS) to deternlne whether 8 W h  a 
reference would help to produce more stable reentries and 
reduce the demand on use of yaw jets at low mach nuober. 
Since a -re 
6. Common Non-Hypergolic Propellants: Other than for the 
main propulsion and booster systems, the Shuttle .mploys 
hypargolic propellants for auxiliary propulsion and power 
generation. Hydrazine and Nitrogen-Tetroxide are Ure 
propellants employed for these purposes. Both are toxic, 
incompatible with many Orbiter naterials with which they 
may come into contact inadvertently, and are difficult to 
handle. None of these attributes are conducive to 
"routine' use and continuing problems involving safety 
and schedule can be expected. During both STS-1 and 
STS-2 preparation and turnaround, the presence of such 
craterials limited access to the Shuttle, and during 
preparations for STS-2 there were two incidents involving 
spills of these propellants. Both these incidents and 
the lack of access impacted the preparation schedule for 
the Orbiter. 
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ft vould be advantrgeous if the u8e of there ptop.lhnt8 
could be avoided. The propellants for the SSNB8, hydrogen 
and ortyqen, albeit cryogenic8, could be w e d  for the 
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) , Reaction Control 
System (RCS)* and APU system8 without rany of the 
operational probl3ms of ::.I hypergolicr. There have been 
significant advances in the technology of hydrogen 8:;: 
oxygen for ancillary 8ySte~s applications since the 
decisions were made to use hypergolic8 in the Orbiter 
a decade ago. 
H2 and O2 should be made. 
A serious review of the possible use of 
The recommended studies and redesigns should be 
established as an overall program for the improvement of 
the Shuttle and its further development as an operational 
transportation system. The Panel fully recognizes the 
budget and schedule pressures that inhibit incorporation 
of changes even if many advantages accrue. The Panel 
also recognizes, the hazard of change itself and its 
impact on procedures and the performance of even 
well-trained personnel and supervision. Thus, the 
concepts suggested are only for the purpose of indicating 
areas of attention for any planned improvement program or 
for defining the configuration for a future block 
purchase of an advanced transportation system. 
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VI. Conclurionr 
The AerO8prCe Safety Advi8ory Panel Gomend8 and congrrtulrter 
all of NASA and it8 contractor8 fa t  the hi8totic flight8 STS-1 rnd 
with the world privileged to watch every rtep. 
there airrions teapets any ruggestionr for irptoverent but, 
impressive as the development has been, the r i a  of the program is 
The 8UCCe8S of 
routine operation. 
suggestions based on it8 evaluation through 1981. 
A. To achieve true operating rrfety, regularity, rnd minimurn 
practical cost, the organization of efforts between the RCD 
community and any transportation service organization should 
In thi8 spirit the ASAP offers there 
be clearly separated. The transportation service 
organization should assume responsibilities rnalagous to 
commercial airline managements. This includes marketing of 
its services to government agencies, and to commercial as 
well as international entities needing space transportation. 
Implied in 'operations' is the planning and acquisition of 
prime hardware and spares, maintenance, certification of 
procedures, training, creation of requirements f o r  future 
development including performance improvement and the 
responsibility to determine readiness for all missions and 
the fulfillment of these missions safely. 
8 .  The Panel suggests a technical audit of the application 
of redundancy concepts to Shuttle systems. From design 
reviews the ASAP believes that many systems can be simplified 
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with both 8afety and co8t benefit8 while other 8yrten8 rhould 
be backed up further for operational rrfety. ASAP candidrtar 








Total hydraulic Po-? 8y8t8a -- both for 8 0 l i d  
rocket and Shuttle control -- including the u8e, 
nmberr, configurrtion and location o f  ruwiliaty 
power p18nt8. 
Baric control 8ystea architecture for aerodynamic 
control., main engin.8, SR68, and Orbiter control 
motors. 
Control of main engine thrust. 
Computer logic in normal and backup modes with a 
special effort to Standardize programming for 
operations to prevent flight-to-flight and 
particularly last minute reprogramming. 
Electric power systems 
Avionics and communication 
The current development state of the space 
transportation hardware suggests that a number of 
concept changes may improve operational safety, 
reliability and costs. In priority, the ASAP suggest: 
1. Investigating a main landing gear with more than two 
wheels per side and devices to avoid gravel 'spray' 
which damages thermal protection tiler. 
2. Reviewing the need for control of SRB nozzles to 
maneuver the tota l  Shuttle vehicle. As performance 
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3 .  
4 .  
5.  
6 .  
D. 
of the COnttol SySteta 8VOlV.8, it ray be possible to 
revert to a programed .trimm 8yrtem on SRBs. In 
addition, when investigating lighter ~8888 
(composites) the separation rnd recovery aystetas 
should be reanalyzed to simplify. 
The automation and simplification of cockpit and 
routine crew duties, along with improved reliability 
of sensors. 
Review of the hysteresis of S I P .  Repeated missions 
will require SIP that is less susceptible to 
dimension changes with steady and vibratory loads. 
Reassessment of flight controls concepts. It is 
suggested that multiple control surfaces or drives 
be considered . 
Investigate non-hypergolic fuel and oxidizer for 
orbital boost, on orbit control motors, and APUs.  
For the remaining RcD flights, it is suggested that a 
"redline" audit be made of limits that should not be exceeded 
for 'ready to launch." It is poor practice to set 
conservative limits and then bypass them at last minute 
launch readiness conferences. 
For 1982 the ASAP plans to follow the developing 
operational transportation program to review hardware 
changes, procedural changes, and the progress in clarifying 
the duties and 
organization. The review of 1982 scheduled flights, their 
readiness and performance, will be a primary ASAP activity. 
responsibilities of any new operational 
3 3  
In addi t ion ,  t h e  ASAP plans  to rev i s i t  non-Shuttle f l i g h t  
a c t i v i t i e s  a t  NASA c e n t e r s  both 8upport an8 tart. 
i n  1982 t h e  ASAP plans  to review concept8 and hrrbwrre for 
S h u t t l e  payloads and upper 8trges r l n c e  u n y  of the  unique 
miss ion equipment item introduce p o t e n t i a l  operat ional  
hazards to both indiv idual  crew members and the S h u t t l e  
i tself .  
t i n a l l y ,  
34 
APPENDIX I 
Name rnd Affiliation 
Willir N. Hawkins 
Senior Adviror Lockheed 
Burbank, CA 91520 
Corporation 
Richard H. Battin 
Charles Stark Draper Lab. 
Cambridge, WA 82139 
Lt. Gen. Leighton I .  Davis 
USAF (Ret.) 
Albuquerque, NM 87123 
Herbert E. Grier 
Consul tant 
La J0118, CA 92037 
Ira Grant Hadrick 
Presidential Assistant for 
Grumman Aerospace Corporation 
Bethpage, NY 11714 
Seymour C. Himmel 
Consultant 
Lakewood, OH 44107 
Corporate Technology 
John F.  McDonald 
Vice President-Technical 
TigerAir, Inc. 
Burbank, CA 91505 
Servi ces 
Norman R. Parmet 
Consultant 
Fairway, KS 66205 
John G. Stewart 
Manager, Office of Planning 
Tennessee Valley Authority 
Rnoxville, TN 37902 
and Budget 
Walter C. Williams 
NASA Chief Engineer 
WashFrgton, 6.C. 20546 
Gilbert L. Roth 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, DC 20546 
Susan Webster 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, DC 20546 
Appointment Cndg -
September 1, 1988 
April 'I, 1986 
D8cemb8r 19 0 la83 
January 18, 1985 
November 17, 1985 
December 23, 1981 
(Consultant status 
through 12/82) 
June 15, 1986 
i96B (in process) 




Ass i s tant 
35 
